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1. Introduction   
 
Presidents necessarily consider many criteria when choosing nominees for the Supreme 
Court.  Such criteria include rewarding loyal political support and friendship by an 
individual, providing an important constituent group (women, racial minorities, 
southerners, ethnic minorities, etc.) a representative appointment, and putting an 
ideologically desirable thinker on the Court.  Other criteria include educational 
credentials, professional reputation, intellectual and professional capability, 
confirmability, and age of the nominee.  Many of these criteria interact with each other, 
complicating the selection decision by requiring trade-offs between them. 
 
One of the more important criteria is the age of the nominee.  Age is very important 
because younger appointees can be expected to serve longer on the Court, influencing 
Court outcomes for a greater period of time.  Republican Presidents regularly appoint 
younger Justices than do Democrats.  Evidence demonstrates that Justices appointed by 
Republican Presidents average between 1.5 and 5 years younger than Justices appointed 
by Democratic Presidents, varying with, amongst other things, the historical period from 
which the data is taken.  Using a computer simulation study, we demonstrate three 
propositions.  First, and least surprising, if Republicans and Democrats behave in this 
fashion for an extended period of time, the Court will yield more conservative holdings, 
though the exact extent to which the Court’s positions will shift rightward in both the 
short- and long-term depends on which of several models of Supreme Court decision-
making most accurately reflects how the Court’s opinions are actually decided.  Second, 
and mildly surprising, the Senate confirmation process can greatly reduce the intensity of 
this rightward shift.  Third, and most surprising (and completely unnoted before this 
article), the widely-touted proposal to limit Supreme Court Justices to a single 18-year 
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2   Hayden W. Head Regents Chair for Faculty Excellence, School of Law and Professor of Business, 
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term will almost completely eliminate the effect of the age differential, moving the Court 
back to the center of the ideological spectrum.  The three propositions supported by our 
study have important implications for proposals to reform the nomination process and for 
possible strategic reactions by Democrats and Republicans. 
 
 1.1 Examples of Trade-offs 
 
Presidents often desire to reward a loyal political friendship, and though one means of 
doing so is through the judicial nomination process, at the Supreme Court level, 
satisfying this criterion proves to be one of the hardest feats to accomplish.  George W. 
Bush’s nomination of Harriet Miers provides a recent, vivid example.  There is no doubt 
that Harriet Miers was a long-term, loyal, active supporter of the President.  She served as 
counsel to George W. Bush’s gubernatorial campaign in Texas and White House counsel 
to Bush when he was President.3  Nominating Miers clearly satisfied his desire to reward 
a loyal political supporter.  In addition, because Miers would be replacing Justice 
O’Connor, the only Republican woman on the Court,4  it was expected that Republican 
women would support another of “their own” as an ideal replacement on the Court.   
 
However, other selection criteria weighed against the Miers nomination, namely 
educational credentials, intellectual and professional capability, and ideology.  Most 
Supreme Court Justices attend elite, highly-ranked law schools such as Yale, Harvard, 
and Stanford. 5  In contrast, Harriet Miers graduated from SMU Law School,6 ranked 
forty-seventh in the nation in 2005 by US News and World Report.7  By means of 
comparison, Justice O’Connor, who Miers would replace, graduated from Stanford Law 
School, which ranked third in the nation.8  In addition, to some, Harriet Miers lacked 
intellectual and professional capability because she seemed to have little knowledge of 
Constitutional Law.9   To be fair to Ms. Miers, her academic and professional experiences 
demonstrate that she is likely extremely smart and able.  Her undergraduate degree was in 
mathematics, she became the first female President of the Texas State Bar,10 and she was 
the managing partner of Locke, Liddell & Sapp, a large Dallas law firm.11  However, 
nothing in her background provided a depth of knowledge about Constitutional Law.  The 
Senate Judiciary Committee asked Miers to redo the answers she had submitted to 
questions she had been asked because the answers were “inadequate,”12 which was 
                                                 
3 Bumiller. 
4 Bumiller. 
5 Of the sitting Justices at that time, Justice Stevens arguably graduated from the least prestigious law 
school – Northwestern – which was ranked tenth (tied with Duke) in 1995.  U.S. News Rankings of Law 
Schools for 2005, http://www.lawschool.com/usn2005.htm, (last visited October 26, 2010).   Justice 
Stevens not only finished first in his class, he earned the highest GPA in the history of Northwestern Law.  
Rosen, page 650. 
6 Fletcher. 
7 See U.S. News Rankings of Law Schools for 2005, http://www.lawschool.com/usn2005.htm, (last visited 
October 26, 2010).    
8 See id. 
9 Greenburg, page 279; Madden. 
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further suggestive of issues with competency.  There were also questions about her 
ideology; conservatives suspected that she was too moderate,13 and she lacked a paper 
trail that would permit vetting of her views.14  And, because she was 60 years old in 
2005,15 she promised to be on the Court for a very long time. 
 
In the end, the opposition from the right wing of the Republican Party, and from 
Democrats,16 proved too substantial.  Harriet Miers withdrew her name from 
consideration.17    
 
The nomination of John Paul Stevens illuminates the interaction of two criteria, 
confirmability and ideology, only without the public fight that Harriet Miers’s 
nomination produced.  President Gerald Ford, a Republican conservative (by the 
standards of the day), was regarded as weak,18 never having been elected to national 
office.19  Ford was appointed Vice President when Vice President Spiro Agnew 
resigned,20 and ascended to the Presidency only upon the resignation of President Nixon, 
rather than by election.21  Thus, President Ford had no national base of voters.22  When 
William O. Douglas left the Court in 1975,23 Robert Bork was the overwhelming 
preference of conservative Republicans to take Douglas’s seat on the Court.24  However, 
as liberal Democrats firmly controlled the Senate,25 President Ford likely anticipated that 
he could not get Bork’s nomination through the Senate, especially since his un-elected 
status reduced the likelihood that he could drum up national support for Bork.  So, 
instead of nominating the very conservative Bork, ideologically ideal but difficult to 
confirm, Ford nominated a much more liberal Republican, John Paul Stevens.26  The 
Democratic Senate responded by confirming Stevens quickly.  Stevens, who was 55 at 
the time of his nomination and confirmation,27 went on to serve 34 years on the Court,28 
third longest in history.29     
  
Finally, the failed nominations of Clement Haynsworth and Harrold Carswell illustrate 
the difficulty of providing a political constituency (in these two cases, southerners) a 
representative appointment while also satisfying the criteria of ideology, educational 
                                                 
13 Bumiller and Hulse. 
14 Eastland. 
15 Bumiller. 
16 In hindsight, the Democrats might have been better served with Miers on the Court than Alito, who was 
confirmed in her place. 
17 Bumiller and Hulse. 
18 Eland at 335. 
19 Eland at 335. 
20 Eland at 335. 
21 Eland at 335. 
22 Roberts at 302. In fact, Gerald Ford was a member of the House of Representatives (R-Mich) when he 
was appointed Vice President, and did not even have a statewide voting constitutency. Ritchie at 95. 
23 DiTullio and Schochet, page 1094. 
24 Bronner, pages 16–17. 
25 Ford at 2642. 
26 Neuborne. 
27 Harr and Hess, page 70. 
28 Stolberg and Savage. 
29 Mauro. 
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credentials, professional reputation, and confirmability.  When the liberal Abe Fortas left 
the Court, President Nixon decided to appoint a southerner who believed in a 
conservative “strict constructionist” interpretation of the Constitution.30  Nixon’s first 
attempt was Clement Haynsworth, a Harvard graduate who was then sitting on the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.31  Haynsworth, who was 56 at the time he was 
nominated,32 was attacked by Senators as being too conservative and of sitting on cases 
where he had a financial interest.33  The barrage of criticism was too much; he was 
rejected by the Senate.34  President Nixon then nominated George Harrold Carswell, a 
fifty year-old judge of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.35  Carswell’s 
nomination ran into serious trouble when a film surfaced of him publicly embracing 
racial segregation in 1948.36  And Carswell, a graduate of Mercer University School of 
Law,37 lacked satisfactory educational credentials, as demonstrated by the fact that 
currently Mercer is not ranked in the top 100 of the U.S. News Rankings for law 
schools,38  listed instead as a “tier 3” school.39  Independent of his schooling, Carswell 
was regarded by many as a “low quality” appellate judge.40  The debate was sufficiently 
intense to prompt Senator Roman Hruska to issue his now-famous defense of mediocrity 
(and, perhaps, a veiled bit of anti-Semitism) as an interest-group issue.41  Carswell also 
went down to defeat.42   
 
President Nixon then threw in the towel and nominated a middle-of-the-road Minnesotan 
and Harvard Law graduate, Harry Blackmun.43  The Senate swiftly confirmed the sixty-
one year-old Blackmun with little fuss.44  Blackmun served on the Court for twenty-four 
years.45 
 
 1.2 Looking at Age 
                                                 
30 Avlon at 271. 
31 Calluori at 362. 
32 Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Clement Furman Haynsworth Jr., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1008. 
33 Calluori at 363. 
34 Calluori at 363. 
35 Calluori at 363. 
36 Calluori at 364. 
37 Schwartz. 
38 The U.S. News Rankings did not exist at the time of Carswell’s nomination, so we base our assessment 
of Mercer Law School’s reputation on current rankings.  We strongly suspect that Mercer has never been 
regarded as a top law school; there is very little change in US News’ rankings of the top 25 law schools 
from year to year. 
39 U.S. News & World Report, Rankings: Best Law Schools, Ranked in 2010, http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/rankings 
40 Calluori at 364; Langran at 4-5. 
41 “Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled 
to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises, Frankfurters and 
Cardozos.” Honan.  
42 Calluori at 364. 
43 Calluori at 365. 
44 Calluori at 365; Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Harry Andrew 
Blackmun, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=187. 
45 Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Harry Andrew Blackmun, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=187. 
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These examples show that “age happens.”  The interaction between the President’s 
nomination criteria can be complex, and greatly limits his choices.  A President may 
desire a younger Justice who will influence the Court’s ideological direction for a greater 
span of time, but since the age of the nominees is just one criterion influencing of the 
decision, the trade-off with other criteria may require the nomination of an older Justice.  
Thus, the overall trade-offs thus determine the age of the appointees. 
 
Rather than merely accept that age is a significant selection criteria, shrug, and walk 
away from the issue, we suggest taking a closer look at age’s effects on the long-term 
ideological direction of the Court, and in particular, the magnitude of its effects.  These 
effects may be considerable because Supreme Court Justices are appointed for life,46 and 
tend to stay in the job for many years longer than a typical professional in any other job.  
With this observation in mind, we suggest asking what would happen if one party were 
routinely to appoint Justices who were older than appointees of the other party.  How 
much difference, we ask, would this make to the political and ideological make-up of the 
Court in the long run? 
 
Why would we ask this question?  Because there is some evidence that one party is 
routinely appointing older nominees.  An examination of recent appointments has 
revealed that Democrats appoint older Justices than Republicans.  The magnitude of the 
difference in age varies, depending on which nominees are counted.47  Since the 
appointment of William H. Rehnquist to the Supreme Court in 1971, Republican 
appointees to the Court have averaged 50.75 years of age, while Democratic appointees 
have averaged 55.25 years of age, for a difference of 4.50 years.48   
 
Alternative measures also show that Republicans appoint younger members of the Court, 
but these measures vary in the magnitude of the difference.  Thus, for example, if we 
were to include the failed nominees Robert Bork (60 years old),49 Douglas Ginsburg (51 
years old),50 and Harriet Miers (60 years old),51 the average difference diminishes to 2.8 
                                                 
46 Federal Judicial Center, How the Federal Courts are Organized: Federal Judges and How They Get 
Appointed, http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/page/A783011AF949B6BF85256B35004AD214. 
47 We are indebted to Tom Miles for a very well-organized parsing of this question. 
48 We will designate an appointee by the party of the appointing President, regardless of the actual ideology 
or party affiliation of the appointee; a Republican appointee is one appointed by a Republican President, 
and a Democratic appointee is one appointed by a Democratic President.  But parts ___ and ___  of this 
Article will feature a more nuanced treatment of the party affiliation of the appointee.  The Republican 
appointees, with their ages at time of nomination, are John Paul Stevens (55 years old), Sandra Day 
O’Connor (51 years old), Antonin Scalia (50 years old), Anthony Kennedy (51 years old), David Souter (51 
years old), Clarence Thomas (43 years old), John Roberts (50 years old), and Samuel Alito (55 years old). 
The Democratic appointees are Ruth Bader Ginsburg (60 years old), Stephen Breyer (56 years old), Sonia 
Sotomayor (55 years old), and Elena Kagan (50 years old). See generally Federal Judicial Center, 
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html, 
49 Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Robert Heron Bork. 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=216. 
50 Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Douglas Howard Ginsburg, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=864. 
51 ABC News. 
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years,52 and if we include Lewis Powell (64 years old,53 and confirmed just before 
Rehnquist)54 and Harry Blackmun (61 years old,55 and confirmed just prior to Powell),56 
the difference in average ages diminishes to 1.25 years.57  On the other hand, if we 
exclude President Obama’s appointments and the failed Republican nominees, and start 
with Rehnquist, the average difference in appointees’ ages balloons to almost 8 years.58  
If we include only “first choice” nominees,59 and measure since Rehnquist, the difference 
shrinks to 2.75 years.60  However, no reasonable manipulation of the data will completely 
eliminate or reverse the difference.61 
 
“So what?” a skeptical reader might ask, bristling a bit at the hints of ageism implicit in 
this finding.  After all, as we just explained above, when a President chooses a nominee 
for a vacancy on the Supreme Court, he must balance several often-competing criteria: 
confirmability, educational credentials, professional reputation, intellectual and 
professional capability,62 experience, ideological similarity to the President, providing 
constituents a representative appointment, paying off political favors, and age.  Hence, 
age emerges from a complex, multifactor balancing process involving numerous trade-
offs.  In addition, Democratic Presidents have had only four appointments (Ginsburg, 
                                                 
52 Inclusion of these nominees raises the average age of Republican nominees to 52.45 years old. 
53 Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Lewis Franklin Powell Jr., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1927. 
54 United States Senate, Supreme Court Nominations, present-1789, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm. 
55 Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Harry Andrew Blackmun, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=187. 
56 United States Senate, Supreme Court Nominations, present-1789, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm. 
57 Inclusion of these nominees raises the average age of Republican nominees to 54.00 years old. 
58 Inclusion of Rehnquist and exclusion of the failed nominees yields an average age of 50.25 for 
Republican Justices. Exclusion of President Obama’s appointees yields an average age of 58.00 for 
Democratic Justices. 
59 Those who were the first nominated for an open seat, but who did not get confirmed.  For example, 
Harriett Miers was a first choice nominee.  Calculating average age for “first choice” nominees requires the 
substitution of Robert Bork’s age for that of Anthony Kennedy, since Bork was the “first choice” nominee 
for Justice Powell’s seat, and the substitution of Harriet Miers’s age for Samuel Alito, since Miers was the 
“first choice” nominee for Justice O’Connor’s seat.  United States Senate, Supreme Court Nominations, 
present-1789, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm.  Although John 
Roberts was technically the “first choice” nominee for Justice O’Connor’s seat, since his nomination was 
withdrawn solely so he could instead be nominated to take Chief Justice Rehnquist’s seat, we have elected 
to consider Miers as the “first choice” nominee for Justice O’Connor’s seat. 
60 Considering only “first choice” nominees would result in the raising of the average age of Republican 
nominees to 52.50 years old. 
61 There is strong evidence that President Obama is nominating older people to the lower federal courts 
than did recent Republican Presidents.  Thus, the average age of appointees to the lower federal courts 
under Presidents Reagan, Bush Sr., and Bush Jr. was 50, while the average age of appointees to the lower 
federal courts for President Obama is currently over 53 years of age.  See generally David Fontana and 
Micah Schwartzman, Old World: Why Isn’t Obama Appointing Young Justices to the Circuit Courts? The 
New Republic, Politics, July 17, 2009, at http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/old-world, visited on 
November 2, 2010.  Our thanks to Micah Schwartzman for allowing us to use his data.   
62 See Cross and Lindquist for a discussion of the difficulties in measuring judicial quality. 
 7
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) during this period.63  Why should we worry about age, as 
opposed to other criteria? 
 
This article produces a tentative answer to the “so what” question by focusing on the 
interaction between two of the many criteria that a President must consider, age and 
ideology.  The basic, intuitive theory runs as follows: the age of an appointee is 
particularly important because an appointment to the Supreme Court is for life.64  A 
Justice may stay for as long as he or she wishes, and cannot be forced to retire.65  As a 
matter of common sense, one would expect that younger appointees to live longer, and 
thus have longer tenures on the Court.66    If one allows age to interact with ideology, 
appointments can have a long-term effect on the ideology of each of the sitting Justices.  
A younger conservative appointee should be a conservative Justice for longer than an 
older conservative appointee would be.  Similarly, a younger liberal appointee should be 
a liberal Justice for longer than an older liberal appointee would be.  More importantly, 
with Republican appointees being younger than Democratic ones, a younger conservative 
Republican appointee should be a conservative Justice for longer than an older liberal 
Democrat appointee will be a liberal Justice.  Thus, the relative youth of Republican 
appointees should, in the long run, pull the law “rightward”—that is, result in more 
qualitatively conservative holdings by the Court.67 
 
Closely related is the issue of whether Supreme Court Justices should be limited to a 
single 18-year term in office.  Many articles, found primarily in law reviews, have been 
published on the topic, and recently, 33 leading law professors wrote an open letter to 
Vice President Joseph Biden, Attorney General Eric Holder, and other public officials 
urging the imposition of this limitation on Supreme Court Justices.68  Some of the articles 
note a connection between unlimited terms of office and pressure to appoint young 
Justices.69  Several pieces in the popular press have noted the suggestion for limited 
terms.70 
 
1.3 Overview of Article 
 
                                                 
63 See note 48. 
64 Federal Judicial Center, How the Federal Courts are Organized: Federal Judges and How They Get 
Appointed, http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/page/A783011AF949B6BF85256B35004AD214. 
65 A Justice of the Supreme Court can be removed through the impeachment and conviction process 
provided in the Constitution, but that is a cumbersome process that has not been invoked for a member of 
the Supreme Court for approximately 200 years.  O’Connor, page 80. 
66 Although a Justice’s ideology may drift over time (Epstein, et. al. 1998), on average appointing a liberal 
or a conservative who will sit for many years will tend to pull the court in that direction.  To simplify the 
modeling, this article will ignore this ideological drift. 
67  As we show in section ___, below, the law should follow the ideological preferences of Justices under 
all of the theories of Judicial behavior extant in political science, with the possible exception of a naïve 
claim that all judges find “the law” in the same way, regardless of ideology. 
68 See http://paulcarrington.com/Four%20Proposals%20for%20a%20Judiciary%20Act.htm, visited on 
August 26, 2010. 
69 Cramton and Carrington. Also see Calabresi & Lindgren (2005-06). 
70 Barnes; Bernstein; Farrell; Marcus 
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This article proceeds as follows.  Section 2 will provide a brief overview of the 
appointment process and review the various theories explaining precisely how the 
ideological leanings of particular Justices affects the ideology, and its extent, expressed in 
the Court's holdings.  Section 3 will introduce a computer simulation of the nomination 
process.  The simulation will model the interactions of the President, Senate, and Court in 
the appointment process over a period of 100 years.  The model will simulate the 
elections of both Senators and Presidents and the departure of individual Justices, with 
the likelihood of a Justice’s departure depending partly on the age of the Justice.  When a 
Justice leaves the Court, the President will nominate a replacement Justice, and the 
Senate will confirm.  The appointed Justice will have an ideology dependent on the 
ideologies of the President and of either the median or the 60th (veto gate) Senator.  If the 
President is Republican, the appointee will be 50 years of age.  If the President is a 
Democrat, the new Justice will be 50+X years of age.   X will be kept constant for each 
batch of runs of the model.  The computerized game will run for 100 years, simulating 
the departures and appointments of Justices over this period, after which the Court 
median71 will be recorded.  We will then rerun the model with the same X for another 
100 years, and note the Court median.  By running the model, with fixed X, several 
thousand times, we can get an empirical distribution of the Court median, contingent on 
that X.  Then, by allowing X to be 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. years, we can map the long-run 
sensitivity of the location of the Court median to the difference in appointment strategies.  
 
By proceeding in this fashion, Section 3 demonstrates three propositions.  First, and least 
surprising, if Republicans and Democrats behave in this fashion for an extended period of 
time, the Court will become more conservative, though the extent of its rightward pull 
will vary in accordance with which theory examined in Section 1 is most accurate.  
Second, and mildly surprising, the Senate confirmation process can greatly reduce the 
intensity of this rightward shift.  Third, and most surprising, and completely unnoted 
before this Article, the widely touted proposal to limit Supreme Court Justices to a single 
18-year term will almost completely eliminate the effect of the differential in age, moving 
the Court back to the center of the ideological spectrum.  This last insight is fully 
explored in Section 4. 
 
Section 4 then proceeds to suggest hypotheses that might explain why the parties would 
choose such different strategies.  The hypotheses will include different discount rates, 
different need to appoint representatives of constituencies, and different attitudes toward 
the politics of confirmation hearings.  Section 4 also explores the implications of this 
article on the age differential and also discusses means of altering the election and 
retirement models used in the simulation found in Part 3 to glean additional insights. 
 
2.  Review of Literature and Theory 
 
Our belief that, as a general matter, retirements and appointments can change the Court’s 
politics is hardly new.  Both political scientists72 and lawyers73 agree with this 
                                                 
71 The Court median is the ideological location of the Justice in the middle.  That is, there are four Justices 
to the right and four Justices to the left of the median. 
72 Yalof; Epstein and Segal. 
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proposition.  Based on this belief, Senators tend to vote on confirmations based largely on 
party and ideology.74 
 
Farnsworth provides the most complete current discussion of age of appointees and 
ideology in the legal literature.75  He argues that most judges retire at about 80, and that if 
a President appoints an aged Justice to the Court, the President gives up the possible 
influence that that Justice might have years from now.  To illustrate this proposition, 
Farnsworth offers an extremely simple statistical model in which one party always offers 
nominees whose expected years of service on the Court is exactly twice the years of 
expected service of nominees of the other party, and each party has exactly a 50% chance 
of making each appointment.  This approach is a good first step.  Our Article is designed 
to produce a more sophisticated model of these processes and generate more illuminating 
results.  
 
Our review of the law and political science literature is shaped by a step-by-step 
examination of the sequential appointment game that eventually, through the votes of 
appointed Justices, produces legal outcomes on the court (the “Judicial Policy Sequential 
Game”).  In particular, the game has four steps.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
73 Moss. 
74 Silverstein. 
75 We have found two articles that examines the age of Justices.  McGuire does not, however, investigate 
party or ideology as it interacts with age.  Farmsworth, 424-30, on the other hand, discusses age and its 
interaction with ideology at length.  On page 428, Farnsworth describes the pressure on Presidents to 
choose young nominees:  
 
Presidents from different parties take turns making appointments, creating a natural prisoner’s 
dilemma: if I appoint older Justices while presidents from the other party appoint younger ones, I 
enlarge the influence of those other presidents at my expense; indeed, no matter what the next 
president of the other party does, I am better off appointing younger Justices—though we both 
would be better off appointing older, better ones if we could bind ourselves through limits on their 
terms. 
 
Powe (2006, pages 104-07) provides an excellent comparison of the ages of Justices with the ages of other 
political leaders and finds that Justices are much older. 
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Figure 1 
 
In this paper, as in much of the legal and political science literature, we presume that the 
strategies chosen by political actors are shaped by their assessment of the outcomes of 
subsequent stages in the game.  For example, in this game, a President would look ahead 
to Stages 3 and 4 to figure out which person to nominate to the Court, attempting to 
predict, of those possible candidates who would be confirmed, who will best shape Court 
outcomes and opinions in a way that will appeal to the President.  Likewise, in Stage 3, 
the Senate will attempt to predict whether the nominee will affect Court outcomes and 
opinions in a way that will satisfy the Senate. 
 
 
Thus, to understand the Judicial Policy Sequential Game, we will start with Stage 4, and 
survey current theories in political science76 and law that connect the ideology of specific 
Justices to the Court’s outcomes and opinions.  With the theories in hand, we can 
understand what effect, if any, a change in one Justice might produce. 
 
2.1. Theories Focusing on the Median Justice 
 
2.1.1. Median Justice (MJ) 
 
                                                 
76 All of these theories are “political” within Frank Cross’s typology of judicial decision making.  Cross at 
1471. 
Judicial Appointment and Judicial 
Policy Sequential Game
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Most of the literature presumes that outcomes and opinions follow the preferences of the 
Court’s median Justice.77  Such a model usually assumes that Justices’ preferences 
(amongst the doctrines possibly controlling the case) can be arrayed on a single 
dimension (usually liberal to conservative) and that Justices have single-peaked 
preferences over doctrinal outcomes.  The further an outcome is from a Justice’s ideal 
location, the less the Justice likes it.  Under these circumstances, the Justice who has 
exactly four Justices to her right and four Justices to her left is the median Justice, and 
she should be able to get exactly what she wants out of the court.  Since the court is 
assumed to operate under rules that are quite “open” – any Justice can offer an alternative 
opinion to the one that is circulating prior to a vote – the median Justice should be able to 
whipsaw those on her left against those on her right. (Baron)  At the end of the day the 
median Justice should get exactly what she wants.   
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Median Justice Theory predicts this outcome regardless of who writes the opinion.  As 
long as the ideal policies and outcomes of the median Justice do not change, Court 
outcomes should be unchanged. 
 
Although Median Justice Theory is a bit heavy-handed, it does accord with received 
wisdom that the Justice in the middle gets her way, reflected in casual empiricism and 
serious scholarship about the Court.  Newspapers and magazine articles commonly refer 
                                                 
77 “[C]onsider surely the most prominent theory of Supreme Court decision making, the Median Voter 
(MV) approach.” (Cameron, Park and Beim, page 1827)  Prominent examples include Hammond, et. al., 
Rodriguez and Weingast, Edelman and Chen, Baker, and Epstein and Jacobi. 
Median Justice Theory
Median 
Justice
Four Justices to 
left of Median 
Justice
Four Justices to 
right of Median 
Justice
1   2        3                 4                   5         6          7                8       9
Justices 1 through 4 offer 
something to the left of 
Median Justice’s ideal 
outcome.
Median Justice counters by offering 
something closer to her ideal on right, 
garnering votes of 6 through 9, forcing 1 
through 4 to respond with a second 
alternative, even closer to MJ’s ideal.  The 
whipsawing continues until the outcome = 
MJ.
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to the “swing” Justice.78  Susan Estrich and Kathleen Sullivan’s article “Abortion 
Politics: Writing for an Audience of One” was targeted at Justice O’Connor, widely 
assumed to be the median Justice.79  Epstein and Jacobi’s “Super Medians” gains its 
intellectual heft from the Median Justice Theory, and a substantial literature focuses on 
techniques for finding empirically the median Justice. (Martin, Quinn and Epstein; 
Grofman and Brazill) 
 
This paper does not assume that Median Justice Theory is correct.  Rather, the paper 
introduces the Median Justice Theory because of its place in the academic literature and 
in popular accounts of the Court, and, of course, because it might be correct.  The 
simulation will be interpreted in accordance with the Median Justice Theory only because 
it affords an opportunity to quickly show the importance of our computer simulations.  
However, our work is important even if one of the other theories, detailed below, more 
accurately predicts how the ideology of an individual Justice affects the holdings by the 
Court, as even under these other theories, a difference in the age of Democratic and 
Republican nominees to the Court will change Court outcomes.  
 
2.1.2.  Majority Median Justice (MMJ) 
 
The Majority Median Justice Theory (Carrubba, et. al) significantly extends the Median 
Justice Theory.  The MJ theory assumed that Justices care about exactly one thing – the 
doctrine (or rule) chosen by the Court.  In contrast, MMJ theory is premised on a more 
complex assumption.80  Each case is comprised of a set of facts, which is identically and 
clearly perceived by each of the Justices.81  A legal doctrine is conceptualized as a 
mapping of all possible sets of facts into outcomes (plaintiff wins or defendant wins).  To 
make the model solvable, MMJ assumes that facts can be uniquely arrayed on a one 
dimensional continuum, and that this is the same dimension that we use for ordering 
Justice’s preferences over legal rules.  A rule, in this one dimensional setting, is just a 
scalar.82  Any case with facts less than the number incorporated in the rule is decided for 
one of the parties, while a case with facts above the number is decided for the other party.   
 
In real cases the MMJ theory must be applicable to the formulation and application of 
rules influenced by multiple facts.  For example, if the issue is whether probable cause 
exists for a search warrant, resolving the issue requires examining facts such as the 
defendant’s criminal history, credibility of informants, characteristics of the location 
searched, etc.  A more conservative Justice may more readily find probable cause on a 
lesser showing of these various facts than would a more liberal Justice.   
 
                                                 
78 E.g., Broder; Lithwick. 
79 Johnson 2009 at 1312. 
80  In an important paper Schwartz 1992 provides the first formal model (of which we are aware) of how 
Justice consideration of multiple facts rather than the propriety of a single rule can produce an opinion 
deviating from the MJ prediction.  
81 This is implicit in the structure of the model set out in Carrubba, but not emphasized in their exposition. 
82 This framework is due to Kornhauser 1992. 
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A clearer demonstration of how this theory functions may be found in he following 
example, which, for the purpose of illustration, is simplified to involve a rule with a 
numerical value: the Court is considering a constitutional challenge to a statute penalizing 
a defendant’s “willful failure” to pay parking tickets that are 70 days overdue with a 
sentence of up to one year in jail.  The issue is whether the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment puts a lower bound on the number of days overdue a parking ticket must be 
before the state can attach criminal penalties for failure to pay.  In this example, one 
conservative Justices thinks that a ticket even seven days overdue permits the state to 
attach criminal penalties in compliance with the Due Process Clause.  One liberal Justice 
believes that the Due Process Clause prohibits attachment of criminal penalties until the 
parking ticket is at least 180 days overdue.  Other Justices will have intermediate views 
of what the Due Process Clause requires.  These views provide the array of ideal 
doctrinal rules that we saw in Figure 2, above. 
 
Each case comes with its own set of legally-relevant facts.  In our example, these facts 
would be the number of days the defendant’s parking ticket was overdue.  These facts 
determine, for each Justice, whether the defendant should win his case against the 
government or go to jail. 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Typically, under the Median Justice Theory, the median Justice determines the holding 
because that Justice can play off the Justices to the right against the Justices to the left.  
However, this may not occur when the Justices have such an interest in which party wins 
that they cannot “switch sides.”  (Carrubba, et. al., at 14-18; Cameron, Park and Beim)  
The following example, built on the earlier parking ticket hypothetical, and illustrated in 
Figure 3, demonstrates this point.  Assume that in the hypo, the defendant’s parking 
Median Justice Theory With Intense Preferences 
For Individual Case Outcomes
1   2        3                 4                   5         6          7                8       9
This case involves parking ticket only 70 
days overdue.  Justices 6 through 9 think 
government should win, but 1 through 5 
think defendant should win.
180  170    150            110               80        60       40              15      7
Minimum # of days overdue before 
parking ticket can garner criminal 
penalties
If the Justices care so deeply 
about whether or not 
defendant wins that they 
cannot switch sides for a 
“better” rule, bargaining is 
only between Justices 1 
through 5.
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ticket is 70 days overdue.  Justice 5, the median Justice, wants the defendant to win.  
Justices 6 through 9, more conservative than (to the right of) Justice 5, want the 
government to win.  Justices 1 through 5, more liberal than (to the left of) Justice 5, want 
the defendant to win.   
 
Justice 4 proposes a rule requiring at least 110 days.  Justice 5 could propose, say, a rule 
requiring 80 days.  Justice 5 would prefer a rule of 80 days to a rule of 110 days.  Justices 
1 through 4 would prefer a rule of 110 days to one of 80 days.  Justices 6 through 9 prefer 
a rule of 80 days to 110 days, but because a rule of 80 days would result in the defendant 
winning, which is an undesirable outcome, they would not embrace an 80-day rule.  
Justice 5 could woo Justices 6 through 9 by offering, say, a rule of only 65 days.  Because 
here, the defendant’s parking ticket was 70 days overdue, the government would win and 
thus Justices 6 through 9 would vote for such  a rule, it being preferable to a rule of 110 
days.  But Justice 5, herself, cannot endorse her own proposed rule, as it would require 
her to switch sides and vote for the government to win, which she would not do. 
 
Thus, under these circumstances, only the views of Justices 1 through 5 will be relevant 
in determining the final rule, since the normal bargaining between Justice 5 and the 
Justices to her right is foreclosed by the party-favoring restrictions in place.  Within the 
subset of Justices 1 through 5, Justice 3 is the “Median” Justice, and therefore, by playing 
off Justices 1 and 2 against Justices 4 and 5, Justice 3’s rule of 150 days will be the one 
expressed in the Court’s opinion, rather than the view of Justice 5, the median Justice of 
the full Court.  
 
Thus, an immediate implication of MMJ theory is that in 5-4 decisions, when the five 
liberals carry the day, Justice 3 controls the opinion.  But in 5-4 decisions where the five 
conservatives control, Justice 7 controls the opinion.  Thus, a small change in facts can 
produce a big change in outcome.  In our example, if the defendant’s parking ticket had 
been 85 days overdue instead of only 70, and Justice 5 wanted the government to win, the 
doctrine would shift from 150 days (Justice 3) to only 40 days (Justice 7).83   
 
In this theory, the Median continues to be important because we need to know whether 
the facts are on one side, or other, of the Median, as the position of the facts determines 
whether the median of the liberals or median of the conservatives controls the outcome 
and the rule established by the Court. 
 
This theory is clearly at odds with what Justices say they do.  The Justices claim that they 
do not take cases to effect justice to individuals, but rather to make rules to guide all of 
the lower Federal Courts. (Perry)  If that were true, and all Justices truly care about is the 
chosen doctrine, then the MJ model might most accurately describe Court opinion-
making.  But Justices might, in fact, care about more than chosen doctrine, and if so the 
MMJ model might be closer to the observed truth. 
 
2.2. Theories Focusing on the Authoring Justice  
                                                 
83  Cameron, Park & Beim, page 1845, Figure 4, call this the “swing” prediction.   
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Several theories give a central role to the Justice who authors the opinion.  They differ 
greatly in their structure, however. 
 
2.2. 1. Author Dominance84 
 
This theory asserts that the holdings expressed in the Court’s opinion are dictated by the 
views of the authoring Justice.  Author Dominance Theory is the outcome of one or more 
distinct models of aggregating individual Justices’ desires into a Court outcome.  Such 
models include where the Court operates under a “first and final offer” bargaining 
structure (Hammond, et. al. at page 111) or where the opinion author had much, much 
lower costs of writing an opinion.  Other models may contribute to this outcome, as well.  
All such models have their roots in the “attitudinal model” of Segal and Spaeth. 
 
The predictions of the Author Dominance theory are parasitic on the underlying model 
that predicts Author Dominance as an outcome.  In addition, as Cameron, Park and Biem 
point out, opinion assignment becomes the crucial determinant of Court outcome.  
 
2.2.2.  Entry Deterring 
 
A more sophisticated author-centered theory of Court behavior is found in the Entry 
Deterring Theory of Lax and Cameron.  This theory emphasizes, among other things, the 
different costs that the Justices have in writing opinions.  Under this theory, the authoring 
Justice can write an opinion that deviates from the median Justice, or from the majority 
median Justice, but is still accepted as the Court’s opinion by moving just far enough 
away from the MJ/MMJ position that no other Justice wants to incur the cost of writing 
an opinion that will woo enough Justices to become controlling.  Thus, by paying close 
attention to the costs of rivals, and by picking exactly the right position, a Justice can 
deter entry (into the opinion-writing “market”) by another Justice.  In this regard, their 
theory resembles “limit pricing” by a monopolist in industrial organization theory.85 
 
Under the Entry Deterrence Theory, the Court’s opinion must lie between the ideal point 
of the opinion’s author and the median Justice, or the majority median Justice, depending 
on the underlying model. 
 
2.2.3. Clustering and Other Complex Theories 
  
If Justices were to care about the impact of their opinions, and if the impact of an opinion 
were to rise with the number of Justices who joined the opinion, there would be a 
tendency of Justices to try to write opinions that could attract a large number of joins.  In 
spite of Justice Brennan’s famous joke that a Justice need only be able to “count to five”, 
86 under Clustering Theory,87 there are gains for a Justice who is able to count all the way 
                                                 
84  Id. Call this “Monopoly Author” at page 1847. 
85 Hirschey, pages 463–65. 
86 O’Connor, page 119. 
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to nine.  A Justice who is contemplating writing an opinion that deviates from his own 
ideal point will be tempted to write in the direction of clusters of judges, so as to gain 
more votes. (Cameron and Kornhauser)     
 
Cameron and Kornhauser’s conception of Clustering Theory characterizes Judges as 
caring about many different variables, such as the impact of their opinions, the doctrinal 
rule chosen, doing justice in the individual case, and the costs of writing opinions.  One 
can regard Clustering as a combination of other theories, but with an added factor, 
impact.  As with any theory that has a lot of moving parts, it is difficult to get predictions 
from Clustering Theory without using specific values for at least some of the parameters.  
In this vein, Cameron, Park and Beim report that for cases involving “moderate” costs of 
writing opinions, “not overwhelming” importance of case impact,88 and no value on 
doing individual justice (thus eliminating the MMJ branch of the underlying theory), 
Clustering Theory pushes extreme Justices to write opinions that are much more 
moderate than their ideal.  Moderate Justices, in contrast, can write opinions much closer 
to their ideal, as they can get joins from Justices to their left or right.  
 
Other hybrid models exist.  Bonneau, et. al., produce a formal model combining author 
preferences, MJ theory, and strategic opinion assignment.  Schwartz’s model combines 
author preferences with costs and opinion quality.  The models are complex and 
impressive, but for our purposes there is one central similarity that drives our paper: over 
time, the Court’s holdings will tend move in the direction of the change in the median 
Justice. 
 
3. Computer Simulation of the Nomination Process 
 
3.1     Modeling the Justice Selection Process89 
 
When a vacancy occurs, a new Justice must be chosen.  The well-known process spelled-
out in the Constitution—nomination by President and confirmation by a majority of the 
Senate90—frames analysis of the choice.  The President has a set of possible nominees, 
and he appraises each of the possible nominees for the possible effect of their 
appointments on the Court’s doctrinal outcomes.91  To do this well, a President would 
first need to know about the individual characteristics of each nominee, particularly the 
nominee’s ideology and intelligence.  But two other criteria, not peculiar to a nominee’s 
individual characteristics, also bear on the President’s choices.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
87  For an empirical precursor to Clustering theory, but limited to same-President appointments, see 
Lindquist, Yalof and Clark. 
88  They term this value “clarity.”  Cameron, Park and Beim at footnote 108. 
89  Our simulation does not require that we take a position on whether the nomination and confirmation 
processes “cause” dissenting opinions on the Court.  See Goff, arguing for this hypothesis. 
90 Senate Judiciary Committee, Judicial Nominations and Confirmations, 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/judicial.cfm. 
91 Nemacheck, pages 30–32. 
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First, the President would like to know which (if any) of the five theories listed above 
(Median Justice, Majority Median Justice, Author Dominance, Entry Deterring, or 
Clustering) most accurately describes how the views of Justices affect the opinions 
published by the Court.  Each theory posits a different means by which this effect is 
produced, and therefore, since the President cares about doctrinal outcomes, 
understanding how outcomes will result is important.  Finding the correct theory is not, 
however, as crucial as it might seem.  All the theories suggest, at least weakly, that a 
President should strive to appoint a new Justice whose ideology is as close to his own as 
he can manage.  The different theories diverge as to how important this is.  Under Median 
Justice Theory, a new appointment that does not move the median is, at least in the short 
run, irrelevant.  In contrast, under Author Dominance Theory, the appointment may be 
extremely important.  And the other three theories, Majority Median Justice, Entry 
Deterrence, and Clustering, all predict that such an appointment may have large effects. 
 
Second, as we discussed in the Introduction, the President would like to know which of 
the possible nominees will likely be confirmed by the Senate (“confirmability”).  Most 
Senators will have preferences about doctrine, and will also appraise a nominee by his or 
her likely effect on Court doctrinal outcomes.  The Senators’ preferences will be 
expressed through Senate process and norms, including the filibuster and the 60 votes for 
cloture required to end it.92  Some candidates will likely make it through this process and 
be confirmed, while others will not.93   
 
The President will thus seek to nominate a new Justice who can be confirmed and who 
will best affect Court doctrine in a way that pleases the President.  These two goals, in a 
nutshell, frame the strategic problem that confronts the President when a seat on the 
Court opens up.   
 
As noted in the Introduction, the President’s nomination decision is influenced by other 
criteria.  These include rewarding friends who have worked hard for him or for his party 
during difficult elections; valuing experiences, whether on the bench or in other 
contexts;94 and giving important constituencies, such as racial and ethnic groups and 
women, a representative appointment.95  For purposes of our exercise, however, we will 
concentrate on the first consideration—Court doctrinal outcomes—and leave the others 
for discussion at the end. 
 
                                                 
92 Beth and Palmer, pages 1–2. 
93  See Epstein and Segal 2005 for much of the history of confirmations. 
94  Chief Justice Taft famously served as President before he joined the Court.  Bratton and Spill show that 
state Supreme Court service is increasingly unacceptable considered an insufficient qualification for 
appointment to the Federal courts. 
95  The last consideration has become so significant that, as of the time of this article, there are no white 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants on the Court.  Of the six men who are on the court, one is African-American 
(Thomas), one is Jewish (Breyer), and four more are Catholic (Kennedy, Scalia, Roberts, Alito). Of the 
three women, one is Hispanic Catholic (Sotomayor), and the other two are Jewish (Kagan, Ginsburg). See 
The Oyez Project, Roberts Court, Biographies, http://www.oyez.org/courts/robt6.  
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Most, if not all, of recent models of appointing Justices to the Court96 (Krehbiel; Moraski 
and Shipan; Rohde and Shepsle) presume that both the President and the Senate believe 
in the Median Justice Theory of Court behavior.  We will initially follow Krehbiel’s 
model in our simulation.  He sets out a four-stage model97 in which a vacancy opens up 
on the Court, the President proposes a new Justice, the Senate confirms or does not 
confirm, and then the Court (with or without the new Justice) votes and decides a case.   
 
The last stage—voting on the Court—requires discussion of the effects of a failure to 
appoint.  A fully-staffed Court is comprised of an odd number of Justices, nine, so under 
the median Justice model, the outcome is always determined by a specific median Justice, 
Justice 5.  So, if the Senate confirms the nominee, the outcome of the vote is the ideal 
point of the median Justice.  But what happens if the nominee is not confirmed?  The 
Court then consists of eight members, and the median is the interval between the fourth 
and fifth Justices (when they are arrayed in order of ideology).  However, Court norms 
require a majority to significantly modify any existing Court precedent.98  On an eight-
member Court, this requires at least five votes out of eight, the same number required 
even if the ninth Justice had not left the Court.  Thus, following Krehbiel, we will assume 
that the presence of an eight-member Court will not significantly affect whether existing 
precedent is changed.99  Or, more precisely, we assume that the President and Senate will 
make this assumption, and propose a nominee and vote accordingly.   
 
In the previous stage, where the Senate is deciding whether to confirm, there are many 
possible veto pivots.  We model a pivot in the Senate.  This could be the voter who must 
be satisfied to vote for cloture.  In this case, there can be no more than 40 Senators who 
are unhappy enough with the nomination to vote against it.  Or, the pivot could be the 
median of the majority party.  In our simulation, it does not matter how the pivot comes 
about, only that the pivot exists.  In the sections below we will discuss relaxing this 
assumption. 
 
The President will nominate the “best” candidate, from his perspective, that the Senate—
which will be identical to the pivot in the initial version of the simulation—will confirm.  
If the President is a Republican, he will nominate a 50 year old.100  If the President is a 
Democrat, he will nominate a 50 + X year old, where X will vary from one simulation to 
another.  Because our simulation presumes that the President is certain about Senators’ 
preferences and the rules of the Senate, and would therefore only nominate candidates 
certain to be confirmed, every nomination will be confirmed. 
 
                                                 
96 See Snyder and Weingast for a median-centered analysis of appointments to the NLRB.  And, for an 
early model without a multimember voting body, see Calvert, McCubbins and Noll. 
97 Krehbiel deems his model a three stage model (pg. 233) because the first stage is purely random, with no 
strategic element. 
98 Hartnett, page 646. 
99 Significant relative to a full nine-member Court—of course, eight-member Courts can change precedent 
if one opinion receives five votes. 
100 Thus, we are implicitly assuming that the net of all of the tradeoffs discussed in the Introduction to this 
Article, where Republicans are giving a fairly heavy weight to age, produces 50 year-old Republican 
appointees. 
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3.2 Modeling Justice Retirements/Appointment Opportunities 
 
The simulation features Justices leaving the Court on a random basis in every year, where 
the departure probability is a function of age.  Statistical literature refers to the age 
dependence as duration dependence.101 The simplest duration model that allows for 
negative duration dependence—i.e., that retirement rates increase with age—is the 
Weibull distribution.102   The Weibull distribution’s two parameters are referred to as the 
shape parameter and scale parameter.103 Unfortunately, unlike with the more typical 
Normal (also referred to as the Gaussian) distribution, these parameters only indirectly 
determine the mean and variance of the expected retirement ages.104 The values of the 
parameters in the simulation were chosen to closely match the observed tenure profile on 
the court accounting only for age of the Justice. 
 
It is, of course, possible to allow the retirement decision be a function of any observable 
characteristics, such as to allow for differences for male and female Justices or for the 
degree of a replacement nominee’s partisanship/ideological position.  In fact, controlling 
for these other observables would allow us to improve a very naïve model of strategic 
retirement; we would allow the retirement probability vary with the current political 
configuration of the President and Senate as well as the Justice’s own ideology. However, 
since we currently have only a small set of observed Justice retirements from which to 
build this improved retirement model, we would want to be careful not over-parameterize 
the retirement decision.  
 
As a first step, we chose a simple parameterization that highlights the importance of age 
of appointees in shaping the ideological distribution of the Court.  More complex 
retirement models may be incorporated into subsequent studies. 
 
3.3 Modeling Presidential and Senatorial Elections 
 
Since our primary interest is in the appointment process of Justices, the simulation 
incorporates a very simple model of elections.  Presidents are elected every four years.  
We model this by drawing the ideal point of the President every fourth year as a uniform 
random variable over the policy space, [-1, 1].   We will assume (without loss of 
generality) that negative values are associated with Democratic Presidents.  Similarly, 
instead of drawing all Senators at each election, we will just draw the cut point of the 
pivotal one again as a uniform random variable over the policy space.  As we noted 
above, this pivot could be the median of the full Senate, or the median of the majority 
party, or the filibuster pivot depending on one’s theory of Senate politics. Our simulation 
is consistent with any model that has only a single pivotal player in the Senate.  
 
                                                 
101 See Willis at 388. 
102 See Machin and Manning at 3099. 
103 Dodson and Nolan at 59. 
104 In fact, there is no closed for solution for the mean of the Weibull distribution is defined by the Gamma 
function of the two parameters.  
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This model of elections is clearly overly simplistic and not realistic. However, by doing 
many simulations with different draws, we are integrating out the uncertainty induced by 
particular choice of politicians.  By allowing for uniform distributions, we are evaluating 
the Constitutional appointment process from an ex ante perspective allowing for any 
future political configuration, including ones that given the current political climate seem 
unlikely.  This is a standard approach in the literature examining electoral rules, since in 
the very long run we do not know the likely political preferences that will be run through 
the game induced by the Constitution.105 
 
There are other possible modeling choices.  For example, we could take historically-
observed election results as a valid sample of all possible political outcomes. We could 
then sample from this set, somewhat akin to a statistical bootstrap, to generate our 
simulation runs.106  Of course, we need to make the strong assumption that the political 
results of the past accurately represent all possible future sets. In the near-term, this 
assumption is plausible, but it seems less tenable as we move out a century. 
 
3.4   Simulation Summary 
 
Since there are several moving parts to the simulation, it is worth recapping the setup.  
 
1. Draw the initial ideal points for the President and for the Senate pivot from a 
uniform distribution on [-1,1]. 
 
2. Draw the initial configuration of the nine Justices’ ideal points from a uniform 
distribution on [-1, 1] and initial ages of Justices from a Normal distribution with 
a mean of 65 and standard deviation of 9.107 
 
3. We then start the simulation.  Each iteration corresponds to a year in our model.  
In each period we calculate the probability of retirement (or death) from a 
Weibull distribution with location parameter (often referred to as α) of 75 and 
shape parameter (often referred to as ρ) of 4 for each Justice.  The probability 
randomly determines retirement.  
 
4. If there is a vacancy, the replacement is determined from the equilibrium, 
described by Krehbiel (2002), between the President and the Senate pivot player.  
Note that the players’ ideal points determine the location of the new Justice on the 
Court.  The age of the appointee depends on whether the President is Democratic 
(with negative ideal point) or Republican. 
 
5. We then increment the age of every sitting Justice and every fourth period redraw 
the President and Senate cutpoint.  
                                                 
105 See, for example, Felsenthal and Machover (1998). 
106 This is the approach used by Gelman, Katz, and Tuerlinckx (2002) and Gelman, Katz, and Bafumi 
(2004). 
107 The starting ages are arbitrary, but the results are not sensitive to the choice parameters. After 100 years, 
the initial age distribution will have no impact. 
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6. We continue the simulation for 100 periods (years) and note the location of the 
median Justice.  Then we restart from 1.  We typically draw 50,000 simulations of 
the 100 periods.  To summarize the results we average, for each difference in age 
between Democratic and Republican appointees, the 50,000 simulations of the 
location of the median Justice in period 100, and report the average.  
 
This simulation should demonstrate how differences in initial age at appointment for 
Democrats and Republicans affect the extent to which the median position of the Court 
moves after 100 years.  
 
3.5    Results 
 
To measure the effects of our model, we compare the results of the simulation, where 
Republican Presidents nominate 50 year olds and Democratic Presidents nominate 60 
year olds, to a control run where Presidents of both parties nominate 50 year olds.108  The 
simulation is symmetric, so that it does not matter which of the party nominates younger 
candidates, as this would only affect the sign (positive/negative) of the drift.  
 
Figure 4 graphs out the median of the Court in each period of the simulation, as averaged 
over the 50,000 runs, providing a very good estimate of the expected median (which is a 
highly non-linear function of the game).  First, we see that for the control run, featuring 
no age difference at appointment, the expected median hovers around zero. This is as 
expected because in this case everything is symmetric.  
 
However, when we turn to the model featuring Republicans appointing Justices that are 
10 years younger, we see in the long run a clear rightward drift in the median in what is 
otherwise a totally symmetric model. The intuition for this finding is simple: Republican 
appointees (with positive ideal points) stay on the court longer. Although the scale of the 
policy space makes this look like a small difference, the expected median has moved 
about 3 percent of the distance of the policy space by year 80.  
 
 
                                                 
108 Note that we could have added some noise to the age of initial appointment, but since we will be 
averaging, this would not change the results at all. 
 Figur
differ
 
 
Not j
final 
the gr
becau
move
 
e 4: Comparis
ence at appoin
ust the mean
year of the s
aph of the m
se with long
 around som
on of the Cou
t versus 10 y
 has change
imulation (y
eans, but a
er tenures, 
ewhat more
rt’s median i
ears. 
d. Figure 5,
ear 100), ill
n increase in
the vacancy
.  
deal point ave
 a graph of d
ustrates not
 variance by
 profile beco
raged over th
ensity plots
 only the rig
 25%.  Aga
mes noisier
e simulation r
 of the medi
htward shift
in, this is ha
, allowing th
2
uns for no ag
ans in the 
 we saw in 
ppening 
e median to
2
 
e 
 
 Figur
runs o
 
We m
age d
show
and tw
the m
linear
the si
non-l
  
e 5: Density p
f the simulati
ust compar
ifferentials l
n in Figure 
enty, whic
ean of the m
 in the age d
mulations ar
inearities in
lot of the med
on.   
e not only an
ead to predi
6.  We run o
h is larger th
edians acro
ifferential. 
e not quite 
 the model.  
ians in the fin
 age differe
cted change
ur simulatio
an any we h
ss the simul
 The picture
enough to av
al year of the
ntial of zero
s in the Cou
n varying ag
ave observe
ation runs. 
 is not perfe
erage out s
 simulation (y
 versus ten 
rt median. T
e differenti
d.  The dots
The expecte
ctly linear b
ome slightly
ear 100) acro
years, but al
hese compa
als between
 in the figur
d rightward
ecause 50,0
 odd cases g
2
ss the 50,000 
so how othe
risons are 
 two years 
e represent 
 drift is 
00 runs of 
iven the 
3
 
r 
 Figur
appoin
 
At th
space
a fair
 
Next,
could
simul
We fi
the m
appea
domi
Presi
e 6: Graph of 
tment.  
e extremes o
 to the right
 bit of rightw
 we will mo
 appoint new
ation withou
nd that, with
edian move
se the Sena
nant strategy
dent’s ideal 
expected med
f the graph,
.  Even if we
ard shift.  
del what oc
 Justices w
t the need f
 a 10-year 
s far more q
te, and henc
 will be to a
point. 
ians in final y
 the age diff
 look at mo
curs without
ithout the ne
or Senate co
disparity bet
uickly than 
e assess for 
ppoint a ne
ear as a func
erential is m
re reasonabl
 the Senate—
ed for Sena
nfirmation,
ween Demo
with Senate
the criteria o
w Justice wh
tion of age dif
oving the C
e values aro
that is, wh
te confirma
 but identica
cratic and R
 confirmatio
f confirmab
ose ideolog
ference at init
ourt 4% of t
und 8 years
at occurs if 
tion.  We ran
l in every ot
epublican a
n.  Without 
ility, the Pr
ical views m
2
ial 
he policy 
, there is stil
the Presiden
 a 
her way.  
ppointees, 
the need to 
esident’s 
atch the 
4
 
l 
t 
 25
 
 
Figure 7: Comparison of simulated median with a 10 year age differential with and without the need 
for Senate confirmation. 
  
Note that, without the need for Senate confirmation, in the first 20 years of the 
simulation, Republican Presidents can move the Court median to the right very quickly 
when compared to where Senate confirmation is required.  The Senate, in other words, is 
quite effective at damping out the effect of the President’s preferred ideological views, at 
least at first.  Eventually, the relentless logic of older Democratic appointments moves 
the median in the Republican direction even when Senate approval is needed. 
 
The vertical difference between the median without Senate confirmation and with Senate 
confirmation provides some measure of the returns to strategic retirements, that is, the 
retirement of Justices when the party which most aligns with their ideology controls the 
Presidency and the Senate, so the retiring Justice’s chosen successor will more likely 
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align with the retiring Justice’s views.  The larger is the difference, the greater the returns 
to avoiding the checking value of the Senate, which is one of the purposes of strategic 
retirement.  Bailey and Yoon.  This simulation shows how important strategic retirement 
can be to the party that chooses older Justices. 
 
Are these results “significant?”  We suspect so, based on the following exercise.  If we 
look at the Martin and Quinn scores for the ideal points of the Justices, starting in 1937, 
and track the score of the median justice from term-to-term, the variation in the median is 
approximately 4%.  Our simulations suggest that a substantial difference in the age of 
nominees between the two parties can produce a drift equal to 3%.  But this 3% figure is 
a computation of the drift comparing what happens when the parties behave identically to 
when only one party starts appointing older Justices.  It is equally plausible to argue that, 
in determining the significance of the drift, the pertinent comparison should be to what 
results when the roles of the parties are fully reversed.  If the Democrats are currently 
appointing older Justices, then perhaps the proper comparison should be to the drift that 
results were the Republicans to appoint older Justices.  If this is the pertinent comparison, 
then the drift is closer to 6%.  In any event, this is in the same general size as the drift we 
find, on average, between terms, and is systematic. 
 
Of course, these comparisons are just suggestive.  The Martin and Quinn scores are 
computed from the observed votes of the Justices on cases that they have chosen 
strategically.  In addition, there is no way to calibrate precisely the imposed scale of 
ideology to the scale we utilize in our simulations.   Nonetheless, if one thinks it 
worthwhile to pay attention to Martin and Quinn scores—and we most certainly do—then 
it is important to pay attention to our results.  The drift that our simulation produces is 
large enough to compare to observed term-to-term movements on the Supreme Court.   
 
4     Implications and Adjacent Literature 
 
4.1   Proposals for Fixed 18-Year Terms for Justices 
 
Our simulation may implicate several key policy issues.  One very important issue is the 
proposal, backed by many law professors and important lawyers, to replace life tenure on 
the Supreme Court with one fixed, staggered 18-year term for each Justice, without the 
possibility of re-appointment. 109  Such a change would require an appointment to the 
Court every two years, thus ensuring that every President will enjoy the opportunity to 
appoint two Justices.  This movement has culminated, thus far, with a letter to Vice 
President Joseph Biden and Attorney General Eric Holder (among others) urging the 
passage of a constitutional amendment making just such a change.110  Public intellectuals 
from across the political spectrum, from Frank Michelman and Judith Resnik on the left 
to Lino Graglia and Steven Calabresi on the right, actively support the effort to move to 
                                                 
109 E.g. Amar and Calabresi. 
110 See http://paulcarrington.com/Four%20Proposals%20for%20a%20Judiciary%20Act.htm, visited on 
August 26, 2010.   
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staggered 18-year terms.111  In short, the working assumption of those supporting the 
movement seems to be that this is a nonpartisan and nonpolitical suggestion.  As noted by 
Roger C. Cramton and Paul Carrington, in reference to the impressive list of people 
supporting this Court reform proposal, “[i]nformed readers will recognize that this list 
includes persons of almost every imaginable political orientation.”112  
 
Significant literature provides reasons for the proposed constitutional amendment. 113  
Although the following list necessarily does not completely account for the complex and 
extensive literature on the topic, the chief arguments made in the pro-amendment 
literature are: 
 
Justices are staying on the Court longer than they used to.  The watershed seems 
to be approximately 1970.  The average tenure on the Court is now more than 25 
years, which is more than 10 years longer than our experience prior to 1970.114 
The long period on the Court erodes conventional legal skills.115 
 
As a consequence of Justices staying on the Court longer than they used to, the 
Justices are older than they used to be.  The increase in age produces more 
frequent cases of physical and mental decrepitude.116 
 
The Justices, as a consequence of being on the Court longer, and being older, are 
less in touch and less in step with the concerns and politics of the day than they 
used to be.117   
 
Confirmation hearings are much more politicized due to the infrequent and 
uncertain appointments.118  
 
Almost no other democratic government has chosen lifetime appointments for its 
judges.119 
 
                                                 
111 Id. 
112 Cramton & Carrington, pg. 7.  See also Calabresi & Lindgren, page 831 footnote 199 (“Indeed, the 
diversity of political and jurisprudential viewpoints of the various commentators we follow demonstrates 
the nonpartisan nature of our proposal.”). 
113 Cramton and Carrington. Also see Calabresi & Lindgren (2005-06); Powe, 2000, 1995; Levinson, 
Meador, Nagel. 
114 Calabresi & Lindgren (2005-06) pages 777-789.  Much of Calabresi and Lindgren’s article focuses on a 
critique of Stras & Scott’s critique of previous work by Calabresi and Lindgren.  For purposes of our 
article, it is clear that the literature accepts that Justices are staying on the Court longer than they used to.   
115 Prakash; McGinnis.  Meador, page 130, is skeptical. 
116 Garrow; Calabresi & Lindgren (2005-06); Powe (2006). 
117 Calabresi & Lindgren (2005-06) pages 809-812;  
118 Calabresi & Lindgren (2005-06) page 813-14.  Many of the commentators complain that the process has 
become too politicized, (Walpin) (but see Calabresi, arguing for more intense politics), although others 
(Farnsworth) point out that it is hard to understand what this argument means, apart from noting intense 
opposition to one’s preferred nominee.  Meador, page 128, is skeptical about this argument.   
119 Powe (2006); Calabresi & Lindgren (2005-06).  
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What does our work bring to this literature?  First, and with some apologies, we inject a 
bit of politics into the analysis.  Our analysis shows that this reform proposal is not 
exactly the politically neutral suggestion that it appears to be on the surface.  Instead, 
rotating, fixed 18-year terms are likely to move the median Justice towards the left, 
though this may be back towards the center of the political spectrum.  This result is the 
product of the assumptions on which our calculations rest, particularly the differential on 
the basis of party in the age of appointees to the Court.  But, as we demonstrated, this 
assumption rests on a reasonably-firm historical basis.   
 
The impact of term limits can be seen in Figure 8, which charts the results of re-running 
our simulation incorporating the 10-year age differential, but both with and without an 
18-year term limit for Justices.  In order to model term limits, rather than draw their term 
directly from the initial age of the Justices, we drew their term as a uniform distribution 
(with mass only on the integers) on [1,17].  We added their term to the age of 
appointment, 50 for Republicans and 60 for Democrats, to back out their ages.  This will 
only alter the initial few years of the simulation after which all of the first Justices are off 
the court.  We are also averaging over a large number of simulations, dampening the 
impact of the initial points.  
 
As we can see from Figure 8, imposing 18-year term limits dramatically moves the 
expected median to the left.  The difference does not reach zero, as was the case with the 
no age differential case we saw in Figure 4, but the difference is not far from zero.  This 
conclusion is subject to several caveats.  First, and most importantly, we assumed that the 
imposition of term limits does not alter the retirement decision of a Justice.  Thus would 
be the case where, for example, a Justice in her 17th year on the Court might want to 
serve her final year even if the retirement model implied by the Weibull model indicated 
that she would retire.  We also assume that the imposition of term limits does not alter the 
appointment politics between the President and the Senate, which could occur since 
likely vacancies would be more predictable.  The differences could cut in either of two 
directions.  On one hand, opposition party members in the Senate might stall 
confirmations, hoping to drag things out until a President of their party can make the 
nomination.120  On the other hand, some have suggested that the certainty of having a 
new seat to fill every two years will lead Senators to be less contentious and overtly 
political during confirmation hearings.121  Finally, the imposition of term limits imposes 
even more non-linearities in the model. This can be seen by the seemingly random 
movement in the graph.  It is likely that with a larger set of simulations, the graph would 
be linear when we averaged.  The qualitative findings, however, would remain 
unchanged.  
 
  
                                                 
120 For example, appointees to vacancies on the National Labor Relations Board and the Board of 
Governors for the Federal Reserve have had their confirmations stalled.  See Nichols and Rosenkrantz; 
Schroeder. 
121 Calabresi and Lindgren, pages 813–15. 
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in touch with the politics of the day further complicates the Republican decision.  Further, 
the simulation demonstrates the relationship between the size of the differential on the 
basis of party in the age of appointees to the Court and the location of the median Justice.  
A Republican would need some probability distribution function over the age differential 
in the future to assess his feelings about the fixed 18-year term for Supreme Court 
Justices.  The multitude of considerations at play complicates predicting the preferences 
of Republicans. 
 
On the other hand, we feel comfortable that Democrats will continue to support the fixed 
18-year term after reading our paper.  For a Democrat, all considerations push in the 
same direction. 
 
4.2  Reasons for the Differential 
 
As we pointed out in the introduction, when a President chooses a nominee for a vacancy 
on the Supreme Court, he must trade-off between several criteria: confirmability, 
intelligence and legal ability,122 experience, ideological similarity to the President, 
constituent desires, paying off political favors, and age.  Hence, age emerges from a 
complex, multifactor balancing process.  However, age can move the median, which is 
crucial to the Court’s behavior.123   
 
Assuming that both the Democrats and Republicans are aware of the effect of age, why 
have the parties acted so differently?   
 
One possibility is that the age difference stems entirely from chance.  Democrats and 
Republicans might similarly value the trade-offs inherent in appointing Justices, and 
random variance accounts for the age differential.  The sample size is small, as there are 
very few appointments to the Supreme Court, and Democrats have been a bit unlucky in 
having fewer Justices to appoint than Republicans.  If the difference is caused by chance, 
the difference will disappear given a sufficiently large sample size, as there is no reason 
to expect this state of affairs to continue.   
 
Although this explanation might be right, it is difficult to confirm, and might be wrong: 
Democrats might value youth less than Republicans do.  We will explore several other 
explanations for why Democrats and Republicans act differently as to nominations. 
 
One explanation is that Democrats have a much higher discount rate than Republicans.  
In other words, Republicans care much more about the distant future than do Democrats, 
and are willing to accept younger, less-accomplished nominees than are Democrats.  
Although this explanation is feasible, it leaves open a critical question: what accounts for 
the difference in discount rate?   
 
                                                 
122 See Cross and Lindquist for a discussion of the difficulties in measuring judicial quality. 
123 This basic point is not new.  Many commentators have noted the incentive to appoint young Justices.  
Powe (2006); Farnsworth; Calabresi & Lindgren; others. 
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Alternatively, Democrats may have fewer degrees of freedom in choosing candidates.  
This explanation envisions the Democrats as a loose coalition of identified interest groups 
(women, African-Americans, Hispanics) of predominantly liberal views, all of whom 
want a representative from their own group appointed.  A Democratic President, 
operating under these constraints, will have fewer degrees of freedom to exercise over his 
choice of nominee, particularly with respect to age.  Democratic Presidents will be forced 
to nominate older candidates, on average, than Republican candidates will nominate.  
There is one main problem with this explanation; it fits poorly with recent history.  The 
most recent two Democratic nominees, Justices Sotomayor (female Hispanic) and Kagan 
(female Jewish) were ages 55 and 50, respectively, at the time of their nominations.124  
Female Hispanics and female Jews would have seem to be two categories that have the 
fewest degrees of freedom.  In addition, one might also point out that Republicans are 
also a coalition, comprising social conservatives, fundamentalist Christians, libertarians, 
and fiscal conservatives.  These groups do not cleave neatly along lines of race or sex, but 
have a strong group identity and view their coalition partners with some distrust.  Our 
best guess is that the Republicans seem to have cut a deal between their coalition partners 
so that social conservatives determine Supreme Court nominations—Scalia, Alito, 
Roberts, Thomas, and Kennedy.125  In return, social conservatives have little influence on 
non-judicial appointees, such as a Secretary of the Treasury.  This explanation, if 
accurate, would explain why Republican Presidents enjoy more degrees of freedom to 
appoint younger Justices.   
 
A third explanation for the differential would focus on the bargaining positions and 
strategies of the players in the confirmation process.  Perhaps Republicans and 
Democrats in the Senate respond differently to nominations by Presidents from the 
opposing party.  In particular, perhaps Republicans are more serious about playing 
hardball politics with nominations by Democratic Presidents than Democratic Senators 
are with nominations by Republican Presidents.  One might expect that there would be 
some interaction between the age of nominees and the intensity of the politics 
surrounding the nomination.  More specifically, we might expect that the younger the 
nominee, the more intense the politics.  After all, compromising on an older candidate 
gives away less; an older candidate will sooner leave office and open up the seat.  If this 
were the case, then we might expect Democratic Presidents to nominate significantly 
older candidates (Breyer, Ginsburg) when facing a Republican Senate than when facing a 
Democratic Senate (Sotomayor, Kagan).126  In contrast, Republican Presidents facing 
Democratic Senates might have no similar reason to compromise on age. 
 
Testing this third explanation would be extremely difficult.  To generate concrete 
predictions about the difference in Republican and Democrat nominees as a consequence 
of the difference in confirmation politics, we would need to know, at a minimum, about 
                                                 
124 The Oyez Project, Biography: Elena Kagan, http://www.oyez.org/justices/elena_kagan; The Oyez 
Project, Biography: Sonia Sotomayor, http://www.oyez.org/justices/sonia_sotomayor. 
125 Some social conservatives would argue against characterizing Kennedy as sympathetic to their views.  
See Waldmeier (discussing social conservatives’ disgusted reaction to Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas). 
126 See supra note 48. 
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the President’s and Senators’ relative discount rates and beliefs over future elections.  
Consider, for example, a situation where a Democratic President faces a Republican 
Senate, and consider the result of Democratic and Republican Senators’ beliefs about 
which party will hold the Presidency in the future.  If both believe that Democrats will 
hold the Presidency in years to come, but Republicans are less certain that this will be 
true, Democrats may not feel that it is worthwhile to fight about whether a young or an 
older Democrat is appointed.  After all when the current appointee leaves the Court he 
will likely be replaced by another Democrat.  Republicans, however, may feel it is worth 
fighting about the age of the nominee, because they are not as certain that Democrats will 
be in power.  Thus, we observe Republicans fighting harder than Democrats.  And the 
intensity with which Republicans fight harder than Democrats should be a function of the 
difference in their beliefs about who will hold the Presidency.  Differences in beliefs 
about which party will hold the Senate should also produce different willingness to fight 
over the age of nominees to the Court.  Similarly, differential beliefs about the likelihood 
of retirements from the Court will produce different willingness to fight over the age of 
nominees.  Lastly, to pull all of this together, we would have to know what the relative 
discount rates of the parties—how much each party cares about the future, relative to the 
other—are for crucial players.  Lacking good estimates of the parties’ beliefs and 
discount rates, we cannot generate the sort of predictions that are needed to produce a 
clean test. 
 
4.3  This Article’s Effects on the Differential 
 
This article may change the politics we observe.  Democrats who read this article may 
realize, for the first time, the long-run effect of selecting older appointees, and alter their 
conduct to permit selection of younger appointees, possibly eliminating the age 
differential in the long run.  Such a result would be made possible only if Democrats had 
sufficient degrees of freedom to alter their nomination choices, but the findings of this 
article may help Democrats secure the necessary degrees of freedom.  For example, 
Democrats may decide to fight harder when Republicans nominate young Justices.  
Alternatively, Democratic Presidents may search harder for younger candidates, or 
persuade their coalition’s constituent groups that nominating a representative from the 
group should be less prioritized than nominating a younger liberal Justice.  Thus, we do 
not expect the differential to last.127  
 
This article may also affect support for the 18-year term limit proposal.  Since this article 
demonstrates that the proposal would largely eliminate the effects of age on the median 
Justice, the article may prompt stronger support for the proposal from the left and a 
weakening of support for the proposal on the right.  However, as discussed supra, even 
though the proposal hinders conservative influence on the Court, conservatives may 
support the proposal regardless because of the other benefits it would confer, such as less 
contentious confirmation hearings and a younger, more physically vigorous Court. 
                                                 
127 The closest analog in the literature comes from the finance literature.  Finance professors have, at times, 
noticed imperfections in the market upon which trading strategies can be built.  Attempts to find the 
imperfections several years later may fail; traders read the article detailing the imperfection, trade on the 
strategy, and squeeze the imperfection out of the markets. Malkiel at 71-72. 
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4.4. Future Research 
 
[Jonathan – this whole section is new]  
 
Although our simulation, in its current state, yields useful insights into the Supreme 
Court appointment process, the models upon which the simulation are based heavily 
simplify the appointment process.  Additional insights may be gleaned by modifying the 
models so they incorporate more complex assumptions regarding elections or retirement 
decisions of Justices. 
 
4.4.1. Elections 
 
Popular reaction to Court opinions may affect Presidential and Senatorial elections.  This 
would likely happen when a Court opinion particularly pleases or displeases a segment of 
the electorate and candidates respond by running against or in favor of the Court or the 
issue that it raised.  Significant  research investigates the correlation of public opinion 
and the Court’s decisions.128  Egan and Citrin explore the effect of the Court’s decisions 
on views of the Court’s legitimacy, and find that general public opinion seldom follows 
Court decisions.  Instead, conservative voters, but not liberal ones, regard the Court as 
less legitimate when it issues a decision with which they substantively disagree.129 
 
We could alter our election model to account for popular reaction to Court opinions and 
see if this alteration affects the movement of the median Justice.  Altering the simulation 
so that the draws for the President and the Senate pivot depend on case rulings would, 
however, require that we model cases, an additional layer of complexity.  As a substitute, 
we might make the draw depend on the distribution of Justices, but it is not clear how to 
implement that strategy. 
 
Other means of altering the election model are also possible.  We could also alter the 
draws of the President and the Senate to resemble historical data.  For example, we could 
start with some year, count the number of Democratic victories and Republican victories 
in the Presidential elections, and then use the relative number to model the chances of 
drawing a Republican or Democratic President.  Such a technique would be very 
sensitive to the year in which we start.  Thus, starting in 1968, we would get seven 
Republican victories and four Democratic victories.130  But starting in 1960 would 
produce seven Republican and six Democratic victories.131   
 
In addition, we could alter the distribution function from which the President and Senate 
are drawn.  The American political system does not commonly elect candidates from the 
                                                 
128 E.g., Casillas; Gaziano; Hoekstra. 
129 Egan and Citrin. 
130 The seven Republican victories occurred in 1968 (Nixon), 1972 (Nixon), 1980 (Reagan), 1984 
(Reagan), 1988 (Bush, Sr.), 2000 (Bush, Jr.), and 2004 (Bush, Jr.). The four Democratic victories occurred 
in 1976 (Carter), 1992 (Clinton), 1996 (Clinton), and 2008 (Obama). 
131 Democratic candidates won in 1960 (Kennedy) and 1964 (Johnson). 
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ideological extremes.  Thus, it might make sense to use a distribution function which puts 
more mass in the center than in the tails.  Our working hypothesis is that this would 
reduce the movement of the median Justice from the center. 
 
4.4.2. Retirement Decisions 
 
The retirement decision model could be altered to account for the effects of strategic 
retirements.  Bailey and Yoon investigate the role of strategic retirements in the context 
of a two-stage game, in an effort to get beyond the “I know it when I see it” form of 
analysis.  Their effort is understandable; strategic retirements, or the lack thereof, on the 
Court can change the course of legal history.  Consider, for example, the Jimmy Carter 
era and the failure of both William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall to retire from the 
Court President Carter and a Democratic Senate the chance to replace them could appoint 
their replacements.  Marshall, in particular, was openly requested to retire:   
In 1979, [Marshall] says, two White House aides called him and suggested that he 
quickly quit the court so President Jimmy Carter could name a new justice. The 
aides reminded Marshall of his heart attack, his difficulties with blood clots and 
his bouts of pneumonia. They painted a sad picture of the possible replacements 
that a Republican like Ronald Reagan might select for the court. The justice 
slammed the phone down. But that didn't stop it. (Williams) 
Marshall, who was 71 years old at the time of the White House call,132 did not retire until 
1991, when he was forced to do so because of ill health.133  President Bush appointed, as 
his successor, Clarence Thomas.  The resulting Court had Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Rehnquist on the right, leaving either Justices Kennedy or O’Connor as the median 
Justice.  Epstein and Jacobi.   
Consider an alternative history.  If Justice Marshall had agreed to retire, instead of 
slamming the phone down, President Carter might well have been able to appoint a 55 
year old who was as liberal as Justice Stevens in 1979.  If this had happened, the new 
Justice would have been only 67 years old in 1991.  There would likely have been no 
appointment for President Bush.  In this alternative history, the median Justice likely 
would have been Byron White or Harry Blackmun.  If Median Justice Theory is correct, 
this would have produced only a small move to the left.  But if Median Majority Justice 
Theory is correct, this may well have produced a massive move to the left.  Under the 
Median Majority Justice Theory, the median of Justice Souter, Stevens, Blackmun, White 
and new Justice would have controlled the opinion.  That Justice would be the most 
liberal of Souter, Blackmun, and White.  In short, a strategic retirement by Marshall may 
have made a significant difference in the ideology expressed in the Court’s opinions. 
                                                 
132 Justice Marshall was born in 1908.  Federal Judicial Center, Biography of Associate Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1489&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na, visited on July 
17, 2011. 
133 Federal Judicial Center, Biography of Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1489&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na, visited on July 17, 2011. 
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We could program a strategic retirement as a higher probability of voluntary retirement 
when a Justice who was appointed by a Republican (or Democrat) observes that a 
Republican (or Democratic) President is in office and an election is nearing.134  We could 
then rerun the simulations.   
We have no strong intuitions about whether liberal or conservative Justices strategically 
retire at a higher rate.  Part of the problem is that there is no good method for identifying 
retirements driven by strategic considerations, as opposed to retirements driven by other 
considerations.135  Did Justice Stevens retire strategically so that President Obama could 
appoint his successor?  He was over 90 years of age when he chose to retire.  Did Justice 
O’Connor retire strategically so that President Bush could appoint her replacement?  She 
denies that she did so.136  We could try modeling strategic retirements based on historical 
data, and designate certain historical retirements as strategic on a “we know it when we 
see it” basis, but for now we feel uncomfortable making such a designation.137  Hence, 
we take no position on whether there is any difference between the parties.   
The retirement decision model could also be modified to account for other variables, such 
as the sex of the Justice or other observable characteristics. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Presidents must weigh, balance, and trade-off between many criteria when picking a 
nominee to the Supreme Court.  Age and ideology are only two of the important criteria.  
However, because Supreme Court Justices serve for life, age at appointment is extremely 
important; younger appointees can be expected to serve more years on the Court and 
hence influence the ideological tenor of its opinions for a longer period of time.  Because 
there is some evidence that Republicans appoint younger Justices than Democrats, we 
simulated the effect of a systematic difference in age of appointments on the ideological 
position of the median Justice.  We found three things.  First, and least surprising, if 
Republicans and Democrats behave in this fashion for an extended period of time, the 
Court will become more conservative.  The simulated results clearly showed a 
conservative drift, and we believe, although are not certain, that the results are 
significant.  Second, and mildly surprising, the Senate confirmation process can greatly 
reduce the intensity of this effect.  Third, and completely unnoted before this Article, the 
widely-touted proposal to limit Supreme Court Justices to a single 18-year term will 
almost completely eliminate the effect of the differential in age, and move the Court back 
to the center of the ideological spectrum. 
   
                                                 
134 This is consistent with Bailey and Yoon’s approach. 
135 Or even deaths.  Consider Justice Rehnquist. 
136 Get cite. 
137 If we were to do such a thing, we might maintain that, at least recently, Justices appointed by 
Republican Presidents would be far more likely to retire strategically than would Democratic President 
appointees, regardless of ideology.  We would count Justices Souter, O’Connor, and probably Stevens, as 
strategic.  The two most obvious candidates at present are Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, but neither has 
made any move to date to retire. 
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